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Abstract 
Trade in agricultural products raises sensitivities, particularly when imports originate from a trading 
partner experiencing an outbreak of some type of agricultural disease. In this article, we explain why 
despite the negative externalities associated with diseased imports, an importing country is generally 
not permitted to ban such imports outright under WTO law. Rather, it is allowed to do so only under 
fairly specific circumstances. We also highlight how the recent India – Agricultural Products ruling 
contributes to the jurisprudence of two issues concerning the SPS Agreement: the interpretation of 
international standards, and the relationship between the risk assessment and scientific evidence 
requirements.  
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1. Introduction* 
Global exports of agricultural goods exceeded $1.7 trillion in 2015, with food accounting for over 80 
percent of their total value (WTO, 2015). Such cross-border movement of food and agricultural goods 
helps ensure the sustenance and economic well-being of billions around the world. Yet, trade rules for 
agriculture remain an extremely sensitive issue. This is particularly the case when agricultural imports 
carry the threat of disease.  
Not surprisingly then, under the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO), member countries 
are allowed to restrict the importation of agricultural products from diseased regions. However, if 
governments could do so without limitation then this freedom could quickly devolve into a 
protectionist excuse that has the potential to seriously thwart trade liberalization in the agricultural 
sector. The relevant WTO rules therefore must seek to balance two competing objectives – providing 
sufficient flexibility for sovereign governments to regulate imports from diseased regions while 
simultaneously culling out protectionist measures for which the threat of diseased imports simply 
serves as an excuse for keeping imports at bay. Getting this balance right is tricky. In 1994, Uruguay 
Round negotiators drafted the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) 
to spell out in detail the requirements that a WTO member must follow when seeking to ban or restrict 
imports of agricultural goods. 
In the intervening two decades, several high-profile and controversial WTO cases have arisen 
concerning imports of agricultural goods that might serve as conduits for introducing new diseases to 
importing nations.
1
 However, until 2012, all of these disputes concerned restrictions enacted by 
developed countries. The India – Agricultural Products dispute2  represented the first time that a 
developing country’s restrictions on agricultural imports from a diseased region were challenged 
before the WTO.  
Developing countries, of course, have several special considerations worth bearing in mind. 
Because a higher proportion of households rely upon subsistence agriculture, the introduction of a 
diseased product may prove more devastating than would be the case elsewhere. Furthermore, 
inspectors in developing countries may have fewer resources and/or less capacity to weed out diseased 
agricultural imports than their peers in advanced economies. 
What is a developing country to do when a communicable disease has broken out in a trading 
partner’s territory but the trading partner insists that its potentially tainted products ought to be 
allowed in freely? Can, and should, the developing country enact an outright import ban? Or is a more 
finely calibrated import quota called for? Can such a trade policy be applied to all imports of that good 
from the trading partner, even if the disease is confined to particular geographic region? Or is such an 
act overly cautious and protectionist, especially since many of its trading partners’ agricultural 
products may not be diseased? 
These very questions surfaced in the recent India – Agricultural Products dispute. In that case, 
India sought to prohibit imports of poultry meat, eggs, and other agricultural products from trading 
partners afflicted with avian influenza (AI) – commonly known as ‘bird flu’ – in order to protect its 
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domestic poultry stock. The WTO Appellate Body confirmed once more that a WTO Member does 
not have full regulatory flexibility to enact an outright ban of agricultural imports from a given trading 
partner afflicted with an agricultural disease. Instead, that measure must be compared against existing 
international standards, guidelines and recommendations. Furthermore, a government must offer 
evidence that the import restriction is necessary and based on scientific principles. The Appellate 
Body clarified that a WTO Member need not necessarily conduct a risk assessment to meet this 
requirement. However, this does not obviate a WTO member from a separate treaty requirement to 
perform a risk assessment.  
This Article discusses and assesses the legal and economic rationale for the Appellate Body’s 
ruling. We explain why an outright ban on imports will generally prove to be excessive from a social 
welfare perspective. We develop a simple economic framework that shows how the optimal import 
policy is linked to the degree of damage caused by tainted imports. The SPS Agreement emphasizes 
the importance of international standards, risk assessment, and scientific evidence in determining the 
optimal policy response of an importing country when imports carry the threat of disease. We discuss 
how the Appellate Body ruling contributes to our jurisprudential understanding of these elements. 
Finally, we draw attention to the controversy concerning the appropriate scope of appellate review 
resulting from this ruling. 
2. A Short Primer on the Applicable Law 
Under international trade law, a country does not have free rein to ban or restrict imports from another 
country simply because its trading partner has been afflicted with an agricultural disease. The SPS 
Agreement establishes detailed rules concerning when countries may restrict agricultural imports to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health.  
Because many agricultural diseases are monitored by international agencies, the law differentiates 
between scenarios when an international standard, guideline, or recommendation has been issued 
concerning agricultural goods affected by a given disease and when it has not. If a WTO member’s 
measure is based on an international standard, guideline, or recommendation, then it is presumed legal, 
pursuant to Article 3.2. Article 3.3 clarifies that a country may deviate upward so long as it meets 
additional requirements set forth in that provision.
3
  
Additionally, Article 5.7 restricts the use of restrictions based on the precautionary principle to 
instances “where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient” such as when the impact of a new 
pathogen remains unknown. However, a WTO Member may only apply such a restriction on a 
provisional basis and must “seek to obtain additional information necessary for a more objective 
assessment of risk” and review the measure accordingly “within a reasonable period of time.”  
In addition, Article 5.1 requires that any restrictive measure must be based on risk assessment, 
keeping in mind techniques developed by relevant international organizations. Article 2.2 further 
requires that the restriction be based on scientific principles and is not maintained without sufficient 
scientific evidence. 
Article 6.1 requires that a WTO Member ensure that any restriction is adapted to the characteristics 
of the area from which the product originated and to which the product is destined. Such an area may 
be “all of a country, part of a country, or all or parts of several countries.” Finally, Article 6.3 requires 
an exporting country claiming that part of its territory is disease-free to provide evidence and allow 
reasonable access to trading partners to demonstrate that this is and will remain the case. 
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accordance with the relevant obligations set forth in Article 5 of the SPS Agreement. 
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WTO law on agriculture and food safety serves as a reminder of the trilemma confronting the 
global economy (Rodrik, 2011). So long as the nation-state remains the focal point for advancing 
globalization, deeper economic integration requires trading off some degree of direct democratic 
governance. Governments in WTO member-states do not possess a carte blanche to prohibit or 
otherwise restrict agricultural imports from disease-ridden trading partners. Decisions made by 
technocrats in international organizations affect and constrain the government’s response.  
3. How India’s Response to Bird Flu Gave Rise to a Trade Dispute  
A government therefore finds itself in a precarious situation when an agricultural disease breaks out in 
a trading partner. On the one hand, it can choose to simply work through the international standard-
setting organization to set the appropriate standards and guidelines and then implement the agreed-
upon recommendation. As far as consistency with WTO law is concerned, this course of action is 
safest. However, it may prove costly domestically. Constituents may criticize the government for 
deferring to an international body rather than exercising its own sovereign authority.  
Choosing alternatively to establish one’s own policies for imports from the afflicted country carries 
its own risks. While WTO law allows for deviations, a government must follow a number of 
requirements. The India – Agricultural Products dispute offers a case study of how this latter approach 
can give rise to trade conflict. 
3.1 Avian Influenza and India’s Import Restrictions  
Avian influenza (AI) is an infectious viral disease that can spread quickly across birds with no 
apparent signs of illness. Once it hits, AI can devastate poultry stock. Incidences have been reported 
worldwide. AI is tracked by the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), an international 
organization. The OIE establishes recommendations for different strains of AI, codified in the OIE 
Terrestrial Health Code. AI strains can be classified into two categories -- high pathogenic (HPAI) or 
low pathogenic (LPAI) -- with the former being much more deadly. Countries are required to report all 
occurrences of HPAI and of certain types of LPAI to the OIE.  
Among the countries that have reported AI is the United States, the world’s second-largest poultry 
meat exporter, which last reported a case of HPAI in 2004. In the intervening decade, the United 
States has reported several instances of LPAI.  
India, too, has notified to the OIE of 95 HPAI outbreaks in the decade between 2003 and 2013. 
However, India has never notified an outbreak of LPAI.  
On 19 July 2011, India’s Department of Animal Husbandry, Dairying and Fisheries (DAHD), 
pursuant to the powers conferred to it by the Livestock Act of 1898, issued S.O. 1663(E). This 
regulatory measure imposed an import ban on imports of live birds, poultry, eggs, feathers, and several 
other poultry-related products from all countries reporting HPAI and LPAI. Restrictions could be 
lifted once a country demonstrated that it was AI-free. On 7 October 2011, India provided notice of 
S.O. 1663(E) to the WTO’s SPS Committee.  
India justified its restrictions on the basis of worldwide AI outbreaks. However, the government 
also could have been motivated by the desire to protect its poultry industry from foreign competition. 
India is the third-largest producer of table eggs in the world, behind China and the United States; per-
capita consumption of eggs grew by 33 percent between 2002 and 2012 (Kotaiah, 2013). India is also 
the fourth-largest producer of broiler products in the world, after China, the US and Brazil (ibid.).  
Interestingly, the structure of chicken farming looks quite different in India. Only 16 percent of all 
Indian poultry is raised in intensive systems (i.e., large-scale, mechanized operations). By contrast, for 
developing countries as a whole, this percentage is 65 percent, while it exceeds 90 percent in China 
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(Robinson, 2011: 57). Unlike elsewhere, Indian poultry farming involves mainly small and medium-
sized farms where poultry farming is not the primary enterprise but done to supplement income and 
diet.  
Therefore, a devastating AI outbreak affects the overall political economy differently in India. 
Whereas elsewhere, it implicates primarily corporate interests, in India, an outbreak afflicts harm on 
an enormous number of households. In a democratic country with over 250 million farmers and in 
which the majority of the workforce is dependent on agriculture-related activities to make a living
4
, 
this can have enormous political consequences. Not surprisingly, the Indian government was keen to 
keep AI outbreaks at bay.  
Did India’s poultry farmers face a foreign threat, necessitating government protection? Not 
necessarily. At present, opportunities for imported poultry products are extremely limited. Indians 
overwhelmingly prefer to buy their chickens and eggs fresh. Over 93 percent of boiler products in 
India are purchased live, whereas most imports are frozen (Kotaiah 2013). Yet, consumption patterns 
will change as household incomes grow and urbanization increases, and some farmers may perceive a 
looming threat. 
What the above discussion demonstrates is that it is not always easy to discern the underlying 
motivation of a government imposing import restrictions on agricultural products from disease-ridden 
trading partners. Genuine concerns over health, political considerations, and protectionism could all be 
part of the equation – the exact contribution of each of these factors is difficult to know with certainty.  
3.2 Why Fuss Over India’s Import Restrictions? 
Importantly, India was not alone in enacting import bans on poultry and poultry-related products from 
countries affected by AI. A number of other developing countries also enacted bans including Ecuador, 
the Philippines, and Saudi Arabia (Nedumpara et al, 2016: 215-16). However, it was India’s measures 
that the US chose to challenge. Why target India? 
In their insightful analysis of the Panel report for this series, Bown and Hillman (2016) note several 
useful facts about the dispute. First, the US is the largest producer of poultry in the world. Major US 
poultry producers have been fairly effective in getting the government to respond to its interests, 
leading to seven antidumping investigations and twelve WTO disputes involving poultry between 
1995 and 2014. Second, though India is a country with a large population, it is not (yet) an important 
destination market for US poultry exports. In fact, in a typical year, Indian imports of poultry from the 
US are estimated to be a paltry $2 million or so. Considering that the US global exports amount to 
roughly $5 billion a year, the Indian economy absorbs approximately .04% of US poultry exports.  
Classical trade policy models teach us that the trade policy interventions of small markets are 
inconsequential for exporters since they do not affect world prices. An import ban on poultry imposed 
by India should simply mean that US poultry exports that would have been sold in India should find 
their way to alternative markets without having any real effect on world prices and therefore US 
exporters.  
Be that as it may, there are several reasons why the US poultry industry might care about an Indian 
ban on poultry justified on the basis of an outbreak of avian flu in certain parts of the US. First, given 
the pace of economic growth in India during recent decades, the US poultry industry might rationally 
expect the Indian market to become significantly more important over time. As Indian consumers get 
richer and start to consume more animal protein, demand for poultry in India is likely to increase 
significantly over time. This is particularly so because roughly 80% of India’s population is Hindu and 
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most practicing Hindus do not eat beef. Furthermore, approximately 13% of Indians are Muslims and 
Islam forbids the consumption of pork. Poultry products are consumed by both groups and are 
therefore of unique relevance to India as a source of animal protein. 
Since initial market penetration can play an important role in long-run market control and brand 
recognition, if the US expects the Indian consumption to take off in the future through habit formation 
(enhanced by low and declining real prices of poultry), then maintaining and growing share today is 
critical. Losing presence in the Indian market today could result in fairly large losses in the future. 
Additionally, the US might be concerned that other countries will enact a ban similar to India’s. A 
successful challenge at the WTO guards against this possibility.  
3.3 The WTO Challenge and Panel Report 
On 6 March 2012, the United States requested consultations, alleging that India’s restrictions violated 
GATT Article XI and multiple provisions of the SPS Agreement. The US asserted that India’s 
restrictions were not based on or in conformity with international standards as set forth in the OIE 
Terrestrial Code (SPS Articles 3.1 and 3.2). It further alleged that the measures were discriminatory 
(SPS Art. 2.3), not based on a risk assessment (SPS Articles 5.1 and 5.2), arbitrary or unjustifiable 
distinctions (SPS Article 5.5), and more trade restrictive than necessary to achieve the proper level of 
protection (SPS Article 5.6). The US also contended that India failed to recognize that the US had a 
system of certifying certain regions as AI-free and therefore its ban on imports from the entire country 
was unjustified (SPS Articles 6.1 and 6.2). Finally, the US argued that India violated the WTO’s 
notification and transparency requirements (SPS Article 7 and Annex B(2) and B(5)(a), (b), and (d)).  
On 14 October 2014, the Panel ruled overwhelmingly in favor of the United States. The US 
succeeded in all but two of its claims, for which the Panel exercised judicial economy.
5
 Because Bown 
and Hillman (2016) have already provided an excellent analysis on the Panel report in this series, we 
refer readers interested in further details to their article.  
3.4 The Appeal 
On 26 January 2015, India appealed all of the Panel’s findings of violations of SPS Agreement, except 
those concerning violations of the notification and timing requirements set forth in SPS Agreement 
Article 7 and Annex B. For several of its claims, India alleged that the Panel violated DSU Article 11 
because it failed to make an objective assessment of the matter. In addition, with respect to the Panel’s 
ruling that India failed to conform to international standards in violation of SPS Articles 3.1 and 3.2, 
India argued that the Panel also violated DSU Article 13 because it had improperly consulted relevant 
experts when making its ruling.  
On 4 June 2015, the Appellate Body circulated its ruling. In all but one instance, the Appellate 
Body upheld the Panel’s ruling. Only on the issue of whether India violated SPS Agreement Article 
2.2 did the Appellate Body find that the Panel had erred in its approach. However, the Appellate Body 
was not able to complete the analysis. We will focus more on the implications of this specific ruling in 
Section 5 of this Article.  
Although India had legitimate reasons to be concerned about AI exposure on account of the large 
population of farmers involved in poultry rearing, it nevertheless could not simply restrict imports of 
poultry products from AI-affected countries as the government saw fit. Part of the bargain of enjoying 
the benefits of the WTO involves agreeing to work through the international system to determine how 
best to regulate agricultural imports from disease-laden countries and regions.  
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4. An Economic Analysis of India’s Import Restriction 
Global pandemics know no borders. But this does not mean that the optimal policy response is simply 
to close off one’s borders entirely to imports from disease-afflicted countries as India opted to do. 
Under what circumstances is such a ban justified from an economic welfare perspective? We address 
this question below in a simple economic model that is useful for illustrating the basic considerations 
at work. 
4.1 A Simple Economic Model to Analyze India’s Import Restriction 
Suppose the imports of US poultry inflict a negative externality on the Indian economy that is not 
internalized by consumers. Let the damage caused by one unit of poultry imports be denoted by δ. The 
parameter δ captures all of the external costs imposed on the Indian economy by each unit of poultry 
imported by the US. Let 𝑝 denote the local price of poultry in India. Let the domestic supply curve for 
poultry in India by  
𝑞𝑆(𝑝)  =
𝑝
2
 
and the domestic demand curve by  
𝑞𝐷(𝑝)  =  𝑎 −
𝑝
2
 
Then, 𝑚(𝑝) =  𝑞𝐷(𝑝) − 𝑞𝑆(𝑝) measures India’s imports of poultry and the Indian import demand 
curve for poultry is given by  
𝑚(𝑝) = 𝑎 −
𝑝
2
−
𝑝
2
=  𝑎 − 𝑝 
Assume that the US poultry industry is perfectly competitive and that India is a small buyer of poultry 
on world markets so that it faces a perfectly elastic export supply curve at the price 𝑝𝑊. Under free 
trade, Indian imports of US poultry equal 
𝑚𝐹 =  𝑎 − 𝑝𝑊  
The welfare of the Indian economy as a function of the level of imports equal the sum of the surplus 
enjoyed by consumers and producers net of the damage caused by imports. The net effect of trade on 
local producers and consumers can be measured by the area underneath the import demand curve so 
that the welfare of the Indian economy under free trade can be written as: 
𝑊 = ∫(𝑎 − 𝑝𝑊 )𝑑𝑝 − δ𝑚𝐹
𝑎
𝑝𝑊
 
The above welfare function simplifies to 
𝑊 =
1
2
(𝑎 − 𝑝𝑊 )
2 − δ 𝑚𝐹 
which can be rewritten as 
 
𝑊(𝑚𝐹; δ) =
1
2
(𝑚𝐹)
2 − δ𝑚𝐹 = 𝑚𝐹(
𝑚𝐹
2
− δ). 
Observe from this formula that a sufficiently high damage caused by imports can make the net gains 
from trade enjoyed by the Indian economy negative. More specifically, we can see that given a 
positive level of imports, i.e. 𝑚𝐹 > 0, 𝑊(𝑚𝐹; δ) > 0 iff 𝑚𝐹 > 2δ which is the same as δ < 𝑎 − 𝑝𝑊. 
In other words, if the external damage imposed on India by each unit of poultry imported from the US 
is sufficiently large then international trade in poultry with the US makes India worse off relative to no 
trade. This implies that the Indian trade restrictions on imported poultry could potentially be justified. 
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But this is not to say that a complete import ban on US poultry can always be rationalized on the basis 
of the above analysis.  
This raises the following question: what is the optimal quantity of imports from the Indian 
perspective? We address this question next. 
4.2 The Optimal Import Quota 
Suppose the Indian government were to institute an import quota denoted by 𝑞 that is less than the free 
trade level of imports, i.e., q < 𝑚𝐹 . Since the quota creates local scarcity, the price in the Indian 
economy increases above the free trade price 𝑝𝑊. From the Indian import demand curve for poultry, 
the domestic price in India associated with the import quota q is given by 𝑝 = 𝑎 − 𝑞. 
Since p will generally exceed the supply price of exporters 𝑝𝑊, those that have the right to import 
can derive some rent from it. Assume that this right to import is granted via licenses allocated to 
domestic agents via a competitive auction that allows the Indian government to collect the entire rent 
generated by the quota as license revenue.
6
 The revenue earned by those holding quota licenses is 
given by 
𝑅 = (𝑝 − 𝑝𝑊)𝑞 = (𝑎 − 𝑞 − 𝑝𝑊)𝑞 
Total welfare in India as a function of the quota can be written as 
 
𝑊(𝑞) =
1
2
(𝑞)2 − δ𝑞 + (𝑎 − 𝑞 − 𝑝𝑊)𝑞 
The optimal import quota q maximizes total welfare 𝑊(𝑞) . The first order condition for this 
maximization problem is given by  
 
𝑊(𝑞) =
1
2
(𝑞)2 − δ𝑞 + (𝑎 − 𝑞 − 𝑝𝑊)𝑞 
 
The above first order condition can be solved for the optimal import quota 𝑞∗ from India’s perspective: 
𝑞∗ = (𝑎 − 𝑝𝑊) − δ 
which can be rewritten as  
𝑞∗ = 𝑚𝐹 − δ 
The above formula for the optimal import quota for a product that inflicts a damage of δ per unit on 
the importing economy is quite intuitive. When δ = 0, imports of poultry impose no external damage 
and the optimal import quota permits the free trade level of imports. Intuitively, if an economy cannot 
affect world prices – which in our case means that the foreign export supply price 𝑝𝑊 facing Indian 
consumers is unaffected by the import quota – then free trade is the optimal policy provided imports 
impose no external costs on the economy. For all δ > 0, however, it is optimal for India to reduce the 
level of its imports by an amount that is equal to the external damage imposed by each unit of the 
imported good. Note also that that 𝑞∗ = 0 only when δ > 𝑎 − 𝑝𝑊, i.e., only when the external damage 
inflicted by imports is sufficiently high that a complete ban on imports is optimal. 
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 Although the economic rationale behind such auctions is fairly sound, they are rarely used in practice. Depending upon 
how the government allocates the quota licenses, the total rent R generated by the quota will generally be split between 
the government and license-holders. In the special case of a voluntary export restraint (which is not particularly relevant 
in the present dispute), the quota rent accrues to foreign exporters. 
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Of course, instead of using an import ban, India could have restricted imports via an import tariff. 
Does it matter which measure is used? To answer this question, we first derive India’s optimal import 
tariff on US poultry.  
4.3 The Optimal Import Tariff 
Let t be the per-unit specific tariff imposed by India on imports of US poultry. The export supply price 
𝑝𝑊 is unaffected by the Indian tariff since India is assumed to be a small importer of poultry in world 
markets. Therefore, the domestic price p in India under the tariff is simply the sum of the world price 
and the tariff: i.e., 𝑝 = 𝑝𝑊 + 𝑡. Indian imports at with this tariff-ridden price equal  
 
𝑚(𝑡) =  𝑎 − 𝑝𝑊 − 𝑡 
Total tariff revenue generated by the import tariff equals 
 
 𝑇𝑅 = 𝑡𝑚(𝑡) = 𝑡(𝑎 − 𝑝𝑊 − 𝑡) 
The optimal tariff from India’s perspective maximizes its total welfare 𝑊(𝑡) where 
𝑊(𝑡) =
1
2
(𝑚(𝑡))2 − δ𝑚(𝑡) + 𝑡𝑚(𝑡) 
The first order condition for welfare maximization is  
 
𝑑𝑊(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑚(𝑡) [1 +
𝑑𝑚(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
] + [𝑡 − δ]
𝑑𝑚(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
= 0 
Using  
𝑚(𝑡) =  𝑎 − 𝑝𝑊 − 𝑡 
and 
𝑑𝑚(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
= −1 
the above first order condition simplifies to 
 
𝑑𝑊(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
= −𝑡 + δ = 0 
from which we obtain the optimal import tariff as  
 
𝑡∗ = δ 
The optimal Indian import tariff 𝑡∗ is nothing but the Pigouvian tax that corrects for the negative 
externality imposed by US poultry on the Indian economy and it exactly equals the per-unit damage δ 
caused by imports. The level of imports under this tariff equals  
 
𝑚(𝑡∗) =  𝑎 − 𝑝𝑊 − 𝑡
∗ = 𝑎 − 𝑝𝑊 − δ = 𝑚𝐹 − δ 
Trade and Agricultural Disease: Import Restrictions in the Wake of the India – Agricultural Products Dispute 
9 
Observe that 𝑚(𝑡∗) = 𝑞∗ i.e. the optimal import quota 𝑞∗ and the optimal import tariff 𝑡∗ lead to the 
same level of imports and are therefore equally trade-restrictive and completely equivalent from a 
welfare perspective.
7
 
4.4 A Graphical Illustration of the Key Economic Tradeoffs 
The general idea underlying the above analysis of import restrictions on a product imposing a negative 
externality on the importing country can be illustrated by a simple graph. In Figure 1, the marginal 
private benefit of imports to the importing economy is denoted by MPB and it is in fact the import 
demand curve 𝑚 =  𝑎 − 𝑝. Due to the presence of the negative externality, the marginal social benefit 
of a unit of imports falls short of the MPB by the amount δ, the vertical distance between the two 
downward sloping curves. Observe that these two lines are parallel to each other since the damage 
imposed by each unit of imports is assumed to be constant and equal to δ.8  
 
While the socially optimal level of imports from the Indian economy’s perspective equals 𝑞∗, the 
equilibrium level of imports under free trade equals 𝑚𝐹, where 𝑚𝐹 > 𝑞
∗. As a result, the net welfare 
of the Indian economy under free trade equals A+B-C, where area A measures the gain in consumer 
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 An important hurdle in the implementation of the optimal trade policy (be it the tariff 𝑡∗ or the quota 𝑞∗) is that there 
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8
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surplus net of the loss of local producers, area B measures the revenue raised by the optimal quota or 
tariff, and the area C captures the loss incurred by the Indian economy due to the overconsumption of 
imports.  
For all units lying in the interval [𝑞∗, 𝑚𝐹] the MSB of imports is lower than the market price 𝑝𝑊 so 
that these imports serve to reduce the importing country’s welfare. The optimal trade policy induces 
the socially optimal level of imports 𝑞∗ and this can be achieved via either an import quota set exactly 
equal to this amount or by imposing the Pigouvian import tariff 𝑡∗ = δ which ensures that the MPB of 
imports ends up coinciding with their MSB thereby inducing the socially optimal level of trade.  
If the damage parameter δ is sufficiently large (i.e. δ > 𝑎 − 𝑝𝑊), the optimal trade measure lowers 
the MSB to such an extent that its vertical intercept ends up lying below the free trade price 𝑝𝑊. Only 
under such a situation is the optimal trade policy to prohibit imports altogether. This is because when 
δ > 𝑎 − 𝑝𝑊 the MSB of each unit of imports is lower than their price 𝑝𝑊.  
4.5 Further Discussion 
While our analysis above sheds light on the incentives of an importing nation to restrict trade when 
imports inflict an externality on the local economy, it is worth discussing how its conclusions depend 
upon some of the underlying assumptions. In particular, the model assumes that imports impose a 
negative welfare externality but is silent about the exact incidence of the externality. In the present 
dispute, the externality could be thought of as generating a health risk for the local population and this 
view is certainly consistent with our formulation above. Alternatively, one might think of imports 
having an adverse effect on local poultry suppliers in India due to the potential transmission of avian 
flu from imported to local poultry. Does it matter how one formulates this issue?  
Second, our analysis above ignores the fact that restrictive trade policies were not the only 
available option for India. For example, India could also have subjected imports of poultry to port 
inspections designed at eliminating tainted birds and/or other types of mitigation measures all of which 
involve significant resource costs. In what follows, we further discuss each of these issues. 
Suppose each unit of imports reduces the domestic supply of poultry by δ units, where δ < 1.9 The 
domestic supply curve for poultry can then be written as 
𝑞𝑆(𝑝, 𝑝𝑊; δ) =
𝑝
2
−  δ𝑚(𝑝𝑊) 
 
Since, by definition, 𝑚(𝑝𝑊; δ) = 𝑞𝐷(𝑝𝑊) − 𝑞𝑆(𝑝𝑊; δ), we have 
 
𝑚(𝑝𝑊, δ) = 𝑎 −
𝑝𝑊
2
−
𝑝𝑊
2
+ δ𝑚(𝑝𝑊; δ) 
which gives
10
 
𝑚(𝑝𝑊, δ) =
𝑎 − 𝑝𝑊
1 − δ
 
Following our earlier analysis, we can show that local welfare under free trade declines with δ so long 
as the adverse impact of imports on domestic poultry is not so large that local supply is completely 
eliminated – in which case changes in δ have no further impact on local welfare. Thus, even under this 
                                                     
9
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we assume that it is known with certainty.  
10
 Note that we cannot allow for δ = 1 since the level of imports cannot be pinned down by the model when one unit of 
imports reduces local supply by exactly one unit. In other words, for δ = 1, the level of imports is indeterminate.  
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alternative approach, the larger the negative impact of imported poultry on domestic poultry, the 
smaller the gains from trade. It is straightforward to show that import restrictions (in form of a tariff or 
a quota) once again have the potential to raise domestic welfare.
11
 
While we focus on a welfare-maximizing framework, Margolis et al. (2005) consider a small open 
economy model along the lines of Grossman and Helpman (1995) in which trade policy responds to 
contributions made by organized lobby groups to the government and imports generate a negative 
local externality via the introduction of an invasive species. Their key result is that the equilibrium 
tariff in such a model exceeds the standard politically optimal tariff that obtains in Grossman-Helpman 
model (in which imports do not generate a negative externality). Thus, the point that trade restrictions 
can be welfare improving in the presence of trade-induced negative externalities is robust to the 
incorporation of political economy forces.  
Motivated by the potential transmission of Foot-and-Mouth disease (FMD) from imported to 
domestic cattle, Paarlberg and Lee (1998) develop a three-country model in which imports from only 
one of the two exporting countries have an adverse effect on the domestic supply of beef in the 
importing country. They show that the optimal tariff imposed on the imports of the foreign country 
that is the source of the externality exceeds the standard optimal tariff (which equals the inverse of the 
elasticity of the export supply curve of that country) due to the risk of disease transmission. 
Furthermore, they show that the optimal tariff imposed on the other exporter (where there is no FMD 
disease) is simply the standard optimal tariff, which in our formulation is zero since we assume India 
to be a small importer of poultry that it is unable to extract any terms of trade gain via restrictive trade 
policies. The findings of Paarlberg and Lee (1998) show that the logic underlying our economic 
analysis extends to a setting where the importing country has market power. Furthermore, their results 
also lend support to the SPS agreement’s requirement that any sanitary measures imposed on imports 
be take account of differences in regional conditions across as well as within countries.
12
 
McAusland and Costello (2004) investigate how an importing country can use import tariffs in 
conjunction with port inspections to address the negative externality imposed on the local economy by 
an imported product. Their key result is that it is optimal for the importing country to use both 
instruments: the optimal import tariff is set at its Pigouvian level to take into account both the external 
damage imposed by those imports that are permitted as well as the cost of inspecting them. Intuitively, 
the possibility of costly inspections does not eliminate the need to reduce the level of imports in order 
to reduce the expected damage imposed on the local economy from infected poultry.
13
  
In this context, it is also worth noting that an import ban imposed by a sizeable market could 
potentially help induce better regulation of poultry production in the exporting country (it could even 
be self-regulation by the exporting industry) where it is implicitly understood by both sides that a 
reduction in the probability of disease could lead to the ban being lifted. Under such an international 
bargain, the eventual outcome could Pareto dominate both autarky as well as a costly and imperfect 
inspection regime on the importing side.  
What if the negative externality introduced is non-linear? An important real-world feature of 
disease-related negative externalities is that they can grow over time in non-linear manner. For 
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 Wilson and Anton (2006) build on Paarlberg and Lee (1998) by introducing mitigation strategies into their model. They 
show that provided the costs of mitigation strategies are not prohibitive, their use can generate net welfare gains and that 
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mitigating tasks.  
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example such externalities could be exponential, S-shaped, or concave. In order to keep our model 
relatively simple, we have abstracted from the possibility of such dynamic effects. While our approach 
is in line with the rest of the existing literature discussed above, it is worth noting that this is an 
important omission.  
The work of Olson and Roy (2010) informs our understanding of optimal trade policy when the 
externalities induced by trade have inter-temporal consequences and the external costs imposed by 
imports evolve over time. They show that an efficient trade policy balances the welfare costs of any 
restrictive measure against the discounted stream of the future costs of control and the social damages 
that are avoided due to the trade measure. They also provide conditions under which it is optimal to 
impose a complete ban on imports versus when non-prohibitive trade policies are efficient. 
In their model, the optimal level of a SPS trade restriction varies in a non-monotonic way over time. 
A complete ban is optimal when the existing stock of disease is such that further entry can generate a 
“big” growth or spread of the disease; if the pre-existing prevalence of disease in the importing nation 
is either very small or very large, the marginal growth rate of the disease is not significant and so the 
import of tainted birds is not as consequential – but in the middle range, it can be explosive. With 
regard to avian flu and poultry, it is conceivable that the rate of spread can be very large even if the 
existing infestation is small (i.e. the growth function maybe concave as opposed to being S-shaped). If 
so, relatively harsh trade restrictions may be justified from a welfare perspective. 
5. Legal Clarifications on Key Principles 
As the above economic analysis demonstrates, it is not always optimal for a government to ban 
imports of an agricultural product from a disease-inflicted region. Under certain circumstances, other 
less-restrictive measures may prove preferable.  
While WTO law provides countries with the freedom to determine the appropriate level of 
protection (ALOP) in the wake of a disease outbreak, it places constraints on the design of the policy 
measure to be enacted to achieve the desired ALOP. Besides emphasizing the core principles of non-
discrimination and transparency, WTO law stresses: (1) the importance of international standards, and 
(2) the importance of risk assessment and scientific evidence. On both points, the recent Appellate 
Body ruling provided additional legal clarification. 
5.1 Interpretation of International Standards Relevant for the Agricultural Disease  
Rather than allowing each country to set its own response to a global pandemic, WTO law provides 
incentives for countries to work together through an international standard-setting body to determine 
the appropriate response to a pandemic. Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement requires that “[WTO] 
Members shall base their sanitary and phytosanitary measures on international standards, guidelines or 
recommendations, where they exist, except as otherwise provided for in this Agreement . . . .”  
Why privilege international standards at the expense of local governance? Why not let each country 
set its own response unilaterally? 
As discussed, agricultural diseases carried by a pest or pathogen generate negative externalities. 
For example, with AI, both the production of poultry and their movement across borders can increase 
the prevalence of the disease. Furthermore, the negative impact of AI may spillover beyond the 
poultry producer itself to affect products, wild populations, producers of poultry-related commercial 
products, and so forth. However, neither the exporter nor the importer may concern themselves with 
these additional costs. In such a situation, regulation by a third party is necessary to address the 
negative externality involved.  
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At the international level, this responsibility is borne by an international organization overseeing 
the disease. This body serves three important functions, akin to that of the domestic regulatory agency. 
First, it acts as an information aggregator and disseminator. The international organization allows 
national authorities to pool information on the disease and serves as a clearinghouse. Second, the 
international body offers a forum for national actors to work out an effective policy response. Without 
it, countries might worry that each might engage in “beggar-thy-neighbor” policies, leading to a 
harmful race-to-the-bottom. The international body provides a means for countries to agree upon a 
common response to be taken, including addressing the question of whether it is necessary to ban the 
product from the diseased region outright. Finally, the international body serves a coordination 
function to address free riding and inefficient resource allocation. It allows for better management of 
resources to fight the disease.  
In this dispute, both the United States and India agreed that an international standard existed – 
Chapter 10.4 of the OIE Terrestrial Code. Specifically, Article 10.4.1.10 states: 
A Member shall not impose immediate bans on the trade in poultry commodities in response to a 
notification, according to Article 1.1.3 of the Terrestrial Code of infection with HPNAI and 
LPNAI virus in birds other than poultry, including wild birds. 
The question presented before the Panel was whether India’s ban conformed to this international 
standard. 
India and the United States disagreed over the meaning of Article 10.4.1.10. India interpreted the 
language narrowly as differentiating between two scenarios – when the AI virus is introduced via 
poultry versus via other birds. The purpose of Article 10.4.1.10, India argued, is to clarify that a ban is 
impermissible in the latter scenario. According to India, Article 10.4.1.10, by logic, suggests that a ban 
is permissible when AI is introduced via poultry, as was the case here.
14
 Thus, India asserted its 
response was based on the relevant international standard. The US interpreted the Terrestrial Code’s 
meaning very differently – as endorsing trade from AI-afflicted countries with recommendations for 
proper safety control measures.
15
  
The dispute therefore raises the question of how are WTO jurists to determine the meaning of an 
international standard when its plain meaning is unclear. The approach taken can have a direct bearing 
on the dispute’s outcome. 
In this case, the Panel turned to consult the OIE directly over the Code’s meaning. In response, the 
OIE clarified that “[t]he intention of Article 10.4.1.10 was to discourage Member countries from 
imposing bans on trade in poultry.”16 On the basis of the OIE consultation, the Panel sided with the 
United States in finding that India’s restriction did not conform to the applicable international standard. 
On appeal, India asked that the Appellate Body overturn the Panel’s ruling because the Panel had 
improperly consulted the OIE as to the interpretation of the Code. DSU Article 13 specifically 
provides Panels with the authority to seek information from experts. Additionally, in the context of the 
SPS Agreement, Article 11.2 states: 
In a dispute under [the SPS] Agreement involving scientific or technical issues, a panel should 
seek advice from experts chosen by the panel in consultation with the parties to the dispute. To this 
end, the panel may, when it deems appropriate, establish an advisory technical experts group, or 
consult the relevant international organizations, at the request of either party to the dispute or on 
its own initiative. 
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India argued that a Panel is only to consult on scientific or technical issues. India asked that the 
Appellate Body find that the Panel had overstepped its authority in seeking input from the OIE on the 
actual interpretation of the OIE Terrestrial Code.
17
 
As Nedumpara et al. (2016: 221) highlight, India’s approach suggests that the matter of interpreting 
the text of the international standard falls to the Panel itself. Because the text is not explicit on this 
question, under the proposed approach, the Panel would rely upon the customary rules of 
interpretation as set for in Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). In 
other words, the meaning of Article 10.4.1.10 of the OIE Terrestrial Convention would be a question 
of law for WTO adjudicators to decide. 
The approach suggested by the United States, by contrast, would render this a question of fact. As 
such, the US argued, it would be entirely appropriate for a Panel to consult with the OIE over the 
meaning of Article 10.4.1.10. After all, who better to opine on the factual meaning of an international 
standard than the body that issued it? 
The Appellate Body has long held that WTO law does not exist in ‘clinical isolation’ from public 
international law. As the Appellate Body again highlighted in this case, ‘relevant customary rules of 
interpretation of public international law’ can be relevant to the interpretation of WTO law.18 But these 
statements do not resolve the question over the nature of the relationship between WTO law and other 
bodies of public international law. In recent years, a sharp division has emerged over this question.  
One point of view holds that WTO law is distinct. WTO covered agreements may reference other 
bodies of international law, but the job of a WTO jurist is simply to interpret the WTO covered 
agreements on its own terms and context. Another point of view argues that different bodies of law 
operate through a form of systemic integration. In certain circumstances, it may be necessary to look 
outside the four corners of WTO law itself and consider its context within the broader framework of 
international law when interpreting a treaty provision (McLachlan 2005). Therefore, it would be 
entirely appropriate for WTO jurists to consider these other bodies of law, and vice versa; the system 
operates through a discursive dialogue. Needless to say, the two camps differ on their view of the 
proper role of a WTO Panel.  
The approach suggested by India veers toward this latter camp. India suggested that a Panel’s duty 
to interpret a WTO treaty provision does not stop at the boundaries of the agreements covered by the 
WTO. Instead, if the WTO treaty provision makes reference to an international standard promulgated 
by another body besides the WTO, then the duty of the WTO adjudicator is to opine on the meaning of 
that standard as well. By delegating this duty to outside experts instead of taking it on themselves, the 
Panel failed to fulfill what is required of it by the Dispute Settlement Understanding.  
By siding with the US, the Appellate Body appears to be rejecting the strong version of the 
systemic integration narrative. At least with respect to international standards set by a non-judicial 
body that is relevant to the SPS Agreement, where there is textual ambiguity or uncertainty, the 
Appellate Body held that it is more than appropriate for a WTO Panel to consult the body that drafted 
and administers the standard to opine on its meaning. Because the OIE Terrestrial Code itself is not 
part of the WTO covered agreements, the Appellate Body suggested that the Panel was not obligated 
to opine on the Code’s meaning by itself. Instead, it was perfectly fine for the Panel to ask the OIE, the 
body that administers the Code, for its interpretation instead.  
Note that in so ruling, the Appellate Body is helping to prevent fragmentation of international law. 
Had it stated that the Panel could not consult the OIE on interpreting the Terrestrial Code, the Panel 
very well might have reached a different conclusion about its meaning than that of the OIE. By 
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allowing the Panel to do so, it helps to ensure that the Code’s meaning remains consistent across 
different bodies of international law, in line with the OIE’s own interpretation. 
Because international standards, recommendations and guidelines play such an important role in 
trade disputes concerning agricultural diseases, the Appellate Body ruling provides important 
clarification over how such standards are to be interpreted. Panels can refer interpretative questions to 
international standard-setting organizations, just as national courts might consult regulatory agencies 
directly when needing to interpret a regulation. Again, this case highlights the extraordinary 
importance of the international standard-setting body, whose role is not simply limited to issuing 
standards, guidelines and recommendations, but also weighing in on their interpretative meaning. 
5.2 The Relationship Between the Risk Assessment and Scientific Evidence Requirements  
Despite the deference given to international standards, WTO law does not demand conformity. Article 
3.3 of the SPS Agreement clarifies that countries retain sovereign authority to establish its ALOP. 
However, WTO law demands that countries wishing to set a higher level of protection meet certain 
requirements. Among these are the requirements of Articles 5.1 and 5.2 to perform a risk assessment 
and Article 2.2 to base its measure on scientific principles and evidence. 
In India – Agricultural Products, the Appellate Body was called upon to clarify the relationship 
between these provisions. At issue were two questions: First, can the risk assessment requirement of 
Article 5.1 be circumvented simply with recourse to ‘scientific evidence’ pursuant to Article 2.2? 
Second, if not, then does failure to conduct an adequate risk assessment automatically lead to a 
violation of Article 2.2? 
Given the resource constraints faced by many developing countries, the answers to these questions 
have a direct bearing on what they must do in the wake of a global agricultural pandemic. By its own 
admission, India did not conduct a risk assessment in line with Articles 5.1 and 5.2. Yet, India had 
assembled some scientific evidence concerning AI that had supposedly served as the basis for its 
import ban. India argued that a risk assessment is not obligatory, but simply a method to fulfill its legal 
obligations. An alternative, India suggested, is to base the SPS measure on Article 2.2, which India 
had fulfilled. 
On the first question, the Appellate Body clarified that these were not distinct choices. It held that 
‘SPS measures adopted by Members must comply with all of the requirements of Articles 2.2, 5.1, and 
5.2.’19 Article 2.2 does not serve as a means to circumvent the risk assessment requirement of Articles 
5.1 and 5.2. 
On the second question, the Appellate Body clarified that a failure to perform a risk assessment 
does not automatically lead to a violation of the ‘scientific evidence’ requirement of Article 2.2. 
Instead, the enacting government must be given an opportunity to present arguments and evidence to 
rebut such a presumption.
20
 Because the Panel failed to consider such arguments and evidence, the 
Appellate Body reversed the Panel’s findings that India’s measures, with respect to fresh poultry meat 
and eggs, were inconsistent with Article 2.2. However, the Appellate Body found that it lacked 
sufficient information to complete the analysis on whether the evidence submitted by India on fresh 
poultry meat and eggs would suffice to meet the requirement of Article 2.2.
21
  
Therefore, the Appellate Body’s ruling leaves unanswered the question of what information, absent 
a risk assessment, would suffice to meet the requirement of Article 2.2. The Appellate Body simply 
made clear that ‘even though the presumption of inconsistency under Article 2.2 flowing from a 
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violation of Articles 5.1 and 5.2 is rebuttable, establishing that there exists a rational or objective 
relationship between the SPS measure and scientific evidence for purposes of Article 2.2 would, in 
most cases, be difficult without a Member demonstrating that such a measure is based on an 
assessment of the risks, as appropriate to the circumstances.’22  
What evidence might suffice? Returning to our economic model, we suggest that such evidence 
would have to clarify our understanding of the harm associated with the imports, as denoted by the 
parameter δ in the model. After all, it is the size of δ that determines whether the import restriction is 
justifiable or excessive. One could envision a scenario in which a government, without undertaking a 
full risk assessment, presents evidence concerning the expected harm associated with each unit of an 
import from a disease-afflicted region to justify its import restriction.  
More importantly, we posit that this unanswered legal question is not a significant one. Why not? 
Even if a Panel were to find that the scientific evidence presented by a respondent found to have 
violated Articles 5.1 and 5.2 meets the requirements of Article 2.2, that Party will still need to perform 
an adequate risk assessment in line with Articles 5.1 and 5.2 in order to bring its SPS measure into 
compliance. Thus, regardless of whether the evidence submitted is sufficient to rebut the presumption 
or not, the need for conducting a risk assessment remains paramount.  
6. Controversy Over the Scope of Appellate Review 
Finally, we draw attention to a controversy related to the Appellate Body’s handling on one other legal 
element of this dispute. India – Agricultural Products represented the first time that the Appellate 
Body has opined on the meaning of Article 6 of the SPS Agreement concerning ‘adaptation to regional 
conditions'. The Panel found India to have violated Articles 6.1 and 6.2 because its import ban applied 
across-the-board to all American exports and did not recognize the concepts of disease-free and low-
disease-prevalence areas.
23
 India acknowledged that it had not done so, but argued that it could not do 
so until the US fulfilled its obligation under Article 6.3, requiring the exporting country to provide 
objective evidence demonstrating that areas are, and likely to remain, disease-free or low-incidence.
24
 
The Panel rejected India’s argument; it held that the Article 6.1 and 6.2 are independent obligations 
and not conditional upon an invocation of Article 6.3.
25
 On appeal, India asked the Appellate Body to 
reverse the Panel’s finding of violation of Articles 6.1 and 6.2, arguing that the Panel erred in its 
interpretation of the relationship between Articles 6.1 and 6.3 and in its application of Article 6.2.
26
 
The Appellate Body rejected India’s arguments and upheld the Panel ruling.27 
Having prevailed, one would not expect the Appellate Body’s ruling to draw the ire of the United 
States. However, in its ruling, the Appellate Body chose to opine on several other elements of the 
Panel’s analysis of Article 6 which India had not raised in its appeal. In particular, the Appellate Body 
‘consider[ed] it important to emphasize that what constitutes an appropriate order of analysis and 
approach by a Panel examining a claim under Article 6 may, at least in part, be a function of the nature 
of the claim and circumstances of that case.’ 28  The Appellate Body explained that it was ‘not 
persuaded that all of the statements made by the Panel would have the same resonance in every case’, 
suggesting that the proper inquiry into Article 6 depends on the particular context surrounding the 
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dispute.
29
 The Appellate Body then proceeded to raise questions and ‘concerns’ over particular Panel 
statements.
30
 
For the United States, this obiter dictum represented unnecessary and improper judicial activism by 
the Appellate Body. Neither the US nor India had challenged the particular Panel’s statements and 
actions on appeal; thus, it was improper for the Appellate Body to opine on legal issues that had not 
been placed before it. In the Dispute Settlement Body meeting adopting the ruling, the United States 
emphasized that ‘particularly at a time when workload issues were increasingly affecting the time-
table for the resolution of disputes, a focus on those issues that had been appealed, and on questions 
that needed to be addressed in resolving the arguments raised on appeal, would facilitate the efficient 
functioning of the dispute settlement process.’31 
At the time, the US protest did not register much attention. However, nearly a year later, in May 
2016, the United States further underscored its displeasure by withholding its support for the 
reappointment of Appellate Body Member Seung Wha Chang. In explaining its action, the United 
States noted the actions of four Appellate Body divisions on which Professor Chang had served, of 
which India – Agricultural Products was one, to which it objected.32 In discussing this dispute, the US 
again condemned the inappropriateness of the Appellate Body ‘engag[ing] in a lengthy abstract 
discussion of a provision of the SPS Agreement without ever tying that discussion to an issue on 
appeal and . . . express[ing] “concerns” in that discussion on findings of the panel that were not raised 
by either party in the appeal.’33 The US emphasized that ‘[i]t is not the role of the Appellate Body to 
engage in abstract discussions or to divert an appeal away from the issues before it in order to employ 
resources on matters that are not presented in, and will not help resolve, a dispute.’34 
In blocking Professor Chang’s reappointment, the United States has been roundly criticized as 
threatening the Appellate Body’s judicial independence.35 Nevertheless, this dispute does raise valid 
questions over what is the proper scope of review by the Appellate Body. Article 17.2 of the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (DSU) simply states, ‘The Appellate Body shall address each of the issues 
raised . . . during the appellate proceeding’ (emphasis added). Article 3.7 also reminds us that the ‘aim 
of the dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a positive solution to a dispute.’ Nowhere in the DSU 
is the Appellate Body accorded the power to opine on elements of a Panel ruling with which it 
disagrees but which the parties have not raised. The function of the Appellate Body is not to act as a 
constitutional court in clarifying the law but simply to assist with resolving the dispute at hand. To the 
extent that the Appellate Body disagrees with elements of a Panel ruling not raised on appeal, it must 
wait for a future dispute raising this point to clarify – just as it would if the entire Panel ruling, and not 
only select parts, were not appealed. 
It is unfortunate that it required as drastic a move as blocking Professor Chang’s reappointment to 
underscore this point. To prevent further recurrences, future Appellate Body divisions ought to bear in 
mind the constraints placed on the scope of appellate review set forth in the DSU. 
                                                     
29
 Ibid., para. 5.143. 
30
 Ibid., paras. 5.143-5.144. 
31
 WTO Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of the Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on 19 June 2015, 
WT/DSB/M/364, para. 7.5. 
32
 The other three disputes mentioned are Argentina – Financial Services (DS453), US – Countervailing Measures (China) 
(DS437), and US – Countervailing and Antidumping Measures (China) (DS449). The concerns raised in each differ from 
that of DS430. 
33
 Statement of the United States at the Meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, Geneva, May 23, 2016, at 4. 
34
 Ibid. 
35
 ‘US Slammed at DSB For Blocking Korean Appellate Body Reappointment,’ Inside US Trade, 34(21), 27 May 2016. 
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7. Conclusion 
While disease outbreaks may well serve as a reason to curb trade in agricultural goods, WTO law 
places limits on this practice, out of fear that the response may be disproportionate and serve as an 
excuse for protectionism. The Appellate Body ruling in India – Agricultural Products reaffirms the 
applicability of two central tenets of the law: the importance of taking into account international 
standards when evaluating the legality of any restrictions and the importance of risk assessments. An 
underlying economic rationale underscores both tenets, related to the failure to internalize the negative 
externality associated with the disease and the need for information and coordination.  
On both issues, the Appellate Body’s ruling added to the existing jurisprudence on these issues. But 
beyond the jurisprudential questions, the Appellate Body ruling is also historic in that it is the first 
ruling to challenge the SPS measure of a developing nation. While India – Agricultural Products is the 
first; more challenges are in process, including one over Russia’s import restrictions on pigs. The 
political economy is likely to be different in the context of a developing country where an agricultural 
disease has the potential to ravage a large number of households dependent on agriculture for their 
household income. But even so, the Appellate Body makes clear that the underlying legal principles 
remain the same. No matter the context, an outright ban is not generally warranted. Instead, it must be 
justified in light of the international response and the risks at hand. 
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